Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium
RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 48 (2014) no. 3, pp. 373-379.

This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities à la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.

DOI : 10.1051/ro/2014012
Classification : 91B52, 47H10
Mots-clés : strong Berge equilibrium, refinement, games with strategic complementarities, fixed point theory, supermodularity 
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     title = {Complementarities and the existence of strong {Berge} equilibrium},
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Keskin, Kerim; Çağrı Sağlam, H. Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium. RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 48 (2014) no. 3, pp. 373-379. doi : 10.1051/ro/2014012. http://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2014012/

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