Règles positionnelles itératives, principe majoritaire et préférences unimodales
RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 34 (2000) no. 3, pp. 347-362. 
@article{RO_2000__34_3_347_0,
     author = {Lepelley, Dominique and Vidu, Laurent},
     title = {R\`egles positionnelles it\'eratives, principe majoritaire et pr\'ef\'erences unimodales},
     journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Op\'erationnelle},
     pages = {347--362},
     publisher = {EDP-Sciences},
     volume = {34},
     number = {3},
     year = {2000},
     mrnumber = {1786467},
     zbl = {1006.91029},
     language = {fr},
     url = {http://www.numdam.org/item/RO_2000__34_3_347_0/}
}
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Lepelley, Dominique; Vidu, Laurent. Règles positionnelles itératives, principe majoritaire et préférences unimodales. RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 34 (2000) no. 3, pp. 347-362. http://www.numdam.org/item/RO_2000__34_3_347_0/

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