Kuhn on reference and essence

Bird, Alexander

Philosophia Scientiae, Tome 8 (2004) no. 1, pp. 39-71.

La thèse kuhnienne de l’incommensurabilité semble mettre en cause le réalisme scientifique. Une réponse à cette mise en cause consiste à se focaliser sur la continuité de la référence. La théorie causale de la référence, en particulier, semble offrir la possibilité d’une continuité de la référence susceptible de fournir une base pour l’espèce de comparabilité entre théories que requiert le réaliste. Dans «baptiser et rebaptiser  : la vulnérabilité des désignations rigides», Kuhn attaque la théorie causale et l’essentialisme auquel cette théorie est liée. La position de Kuhn est défendue par Rupert Read et Wes Sharrok [Read & Sharrok 2002b$]$. Dans cet article, j’examine les arguments présentés par Kuhn, Read et Sharrok, et je montre qu’ils ne fournissent aucune raison de douter ni de la théorie causale, ni de l’essentialisme.

Kuhn's incommensurability thesis seems to challenge scientific realism. One response to that challenge is to focus on the continuity of reference. The causal theory of reference in particular seems to offer the possibility of continuity of reference that would provide a basis for the sort of comparability between theories that the realist requires. In “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation” Kuhn attacks the causal theory and the essentialism to which it is related. Kuhn's view is defended by Rupert Read and Wes Sharrock [Read & Sharrok 2002b$]$. In this paper I examine the arguments presented by Kuhn, Read, and Sharrock and show that they provide no reason to doubt either the causal theory or essentialism.

[1] Bird, Alexander 2000.- Thomas Kuhn, Chesham: Acumen.

[2] Bird, Alexander 2001.- Necessarily, Salt Dissolves in Water, Analysis 61: 267-274.

[3] Bird, Alexander 2002.- On Whether Some Laws are Necessary, Analysis 62: 257-270.

[4] Bird, Alexander 2003.- Kuhn, Nominalism, and Empiricism, Philosophy of Science 70: 690-719. | MR

[5] Fine, K. 1994.- Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1-16.

[6] Frege, Gottlob 1892.- On Sense and Meaning

[7] Geach P. and Black M. (editors) 1952.- Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell. | Zbl

[8] Gunderson K. (editors) 1975.- Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

[9] Kripke, Saul 1980.- Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell.

[10] Kuhn, Thomas 1970.- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[11] Kuhn, Thomas 1974.- Second Thoughts on Paradigms

[12] Kuhn, Thomas 1990.- Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation

[13] Locke, John 1690.- An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, A.D. Woozley (editor), Glasgow: Collins, III, vi, 13, 1964.

[14] Putnam, Hilary 1975a.- The Meaning of ‘Meaning'

[15] Putnam, Hilary 1975b.- Mind, Language, and Reality, Philosophical Papers, II, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. | Zbl

[16] Read, Ruppert and Sharrock Wes 2002.- Thomas Kuhn's Misunderstood Relation to Kripke-Putnam Essentialism, Journal for the General Philosophy of Science, 33: 151-158 | MR

[17] Sankey, Howard 1994.- The Incommensurability Thesis, Aldershot: Avebury.

[18] Suppe (editor) 1974.- The Structure of Scientific Theories, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press. | MR

[19] Wade Savage C. (editor) 1990.- Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.