Jeux répétés à information incomplète
Journées mathématiques X-UPS, Théorie des jeux – Introduction à la théorie des jeux répétés (2006), pp. 45-92.
Publié le :
DOI : 10.5802/xups.2006-03
Renault, Jérôme 1

1 Ceremade, Université Paris Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris cedex 16
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     title = {Jeux r\'ep\'et\'es \`a information incompl\`ete},
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Renault, Jérôme. Jeux répétés à information incomplète. Journées mathématiques X-UPS, Théorie des jeux – Introduction à la théorie des jeux répétés (2006), pp. 45-92. doi : 10.5802/xups.2006-03. http://www.numdam.org/articles/10.5802/xups.2006-03/

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