Strategic investments in R&D and efficiency in the presence of free riders
Ben Brahim, Mouna1 ; Zaccour, Georges2 ; Ben Abdelaziz, Fouad3
1 École Supérieure de Tunis, Tunisia.
2 Chair in Game Theory and Management, GERAD, HEC Montréal, Canada.
3 NEOMA Business School, Mont Saint-Aignan, France.
RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 50 (2016) no. 3, pp. 611-625.

We consider an industry composed of two types of firms, namely, innovators that invest in process research and development (R&D), and surfers that do not but benefit from knowledge spillover.We verify if the conclusions reached in the seminal paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin hold in this setting.We obtain that cooperation among innovators still lead to higher R&D and output levels than when they do not cooperate.Our main result is that the presence of surfers in an industry can be welfare improving under some conditions.

Reçu le :
Accepté le :
DOI : 10.1051/ro/2015054
Classification : 91A10, 91A20
Mots-clés : Investments in R&D, cooperation, noncooperation, Spillover, free riders, social Welfare
Ben Brahim, Mouna 1 ; Zaccour, Georges 2 ; Ben Abdelaziz, Fouad 3

1 École Supérieure de Tunis, Tunisia.
2 Chair in Game Theory and Management, GERAD, HEC Montréal, Canada.
3 NEOMA Business School, Mont Saint-Aignan, France. 
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     title = {Strategic investments in {R&D} and efficiency in the presence of free riders},
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Ben Brahim, Mouna; Zaccour, Georges; Ben Abdelaziz, Fouad. Strategic investments in R&D and efficiency in the presence of free riders. RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 50 (2016) no. 3, pp. 611-625. doi : 10.1051/ro/2015054. http://www.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2015054/

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